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Viacom v. YouTube: A Different View on the District Court Ruling 
Prof. Jim Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law 
July 13, 2010 
In an earlier essay in this series, Randy Picker discussed the recent copyright decision in Viacom 
v. YouTube, and in particular the court’s ruling that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “safe 
harbor” for remote storage applies to YouTube’s online video service.  I agree with Randy that 
the court’s interpretation of the DMCA is problematic, but I see a good argument that the 
outcome is correct and that the ruling should be affirmed on appeal. 
Viacom v. YouTube is a hugely important case.  It pits the world’s fourth-biggest media company 
against Internet behemoth Google, which purchased YouTube in 2006 for $1.65 billion.  The 
latest ruling finds that YouTube’s core business – the storage, searching, and transmission of 
user-uploaded video – does not violate copyright law, as long as YouTube expeditiously removes 
unauthorized copyrighted material when it becomes aware of it.  (That’s a simplification of the 
decision, but it will do for present purposes.) 
The basis for the court’s ruling is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”), the 
federal statute that balances copyright concerns against Internet technologies.  In the late 1990s, 
Congress recognized that lots of relatively routine Internet transactions involve unauthorized 
copying of copyrighted content.  After all, the Internet is essentially a big machine for copying 
and transmitting information, some of which is copyrighted. 
So in 1998 Congress passed the DMCA, which attempts to draw the line between worrisome 
online infringements that should lead to liability and mere technical infringements that should 
not.  The Act identifies four such technical infringements and establishes statutory “safe 
harbors” for the Internet companies that engage in them, essentially insulating online service 
providers from copyright liability for four distinct kinds of Internet transactions.  In Viacom v. 
YouTube, the court held that one of these four safe harbors applied to YouTube: the safe harbor 
for online “storage,” found in Section 512(c) of the DMCA. 
The problem is that YouTube does more than merely store video.  Indeed, its main value derives 
from its transmission of video to Internet users.  This is an important distinction for copyright 
purposes, because copyright law calls that kind of transmission a “performance” – and under 
certain circumstances a performance of a copyrighted work constitutes infringement, even if no 
permanent copy is made.  The Viacom court found that this transmission fit within the storage 
safe harbor, but that finding is a stretch, for reasons that Randy Picker has pointed out. 
So why do I think the court’s ruling is defensible?  Well, I have a big-picture reason and a more 
technical, legalistic reason. 
Let’s look at the big picture first.  By the time the DMCA was enacted, the Internet’s World 
Wide Web interface was in full swing, with its combination of text, graphics, and hyperlinks.  In 
addition, courts had begun to address the thorny liability issues that confront website hosts when 
their users post infringing material. 
When Congress passed the DMCA, then, it clearly had in mind much more than remote storage; 
it also meant to design safe harbors for those who transmit copyrighted content.  Indeed, the 
House and Senate reports refer to “World Wide Web sites” and “online site[s] offering audio or 
video.”  So it would be very odd indeed if the DMCA’s protection were limited to those who 
host remote storage facilities. 
Of course, legislative history is no help if the actual legislation itself says something 
different.  (Indeed, some experts on statutory interpretation would ignore legislative history no 
matter what it says.)  So is there any specific provision in the DMCA itself that might protect 
YouTube? 
Here we get to the more technical, legalistic justification for the Viacom v. YouTube outcome: 
the safe harbor for “transitory digital network communications,” found in Section 512(a) of the 
DMCA.  Although the district court did not mention this one, it protects an online service that 
transmits unmodified copyrighted material, as long as some third party initiates the transmission 
and chooses the recipient.  If we are looking for a statutory safe harbor that goes beyond storage 
and applies to the sending of copyrighted material from YouTube to an end user, here it is. 
Indeed, this distinction between storage and transmission lines up nicely with the way that 
copyright law generally distinguishes copies from performances.  Copyright’s “reproduction” 
right governs the making of permanent copies – the sorts of copies that a website could store 
permanently.  And copyright’s “performance” right governs fleeting manifestations of 
copyrighted content – those that disappear from the screen when a transmission ends.  We see 
this same division in the DMCA’s safe harbor, and with good reason; Congress knew that it 
wanted to protect online service providers from liability for both unauthorized reproduction and 
unauthorized performance.  The DMCA would have been fairly useless if it covered only one of 
those rights. 
In the end, then, an argument that the DMCA does not protect Internet services that store and 
transmit copyrighted content proves too much.  If YouTube falls outside the DMCA’s safe 
harbors because it transmits video, then every website that hosts third-party material is outside 
the safe harbor as well, because websites transmit their contents to the public just like YouTube 
transmits video.  More important, the companies that host those websites would also be denied 
DMCA protection.  No safe harbors for those that bring us websites, message boards, the Usenet, 
RSS feeds, and all sorts of other useful Internet technologies?  This is not what Congress had in 
mind, as both the history and the text of the DMCA makes clear. 
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